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IS THE EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY (COMPULSORY INSURANCE) ACT 
1969 FIT FOR PURPOSE? 
 
BRENDA BARRETT* AND DAVID LEWIS** 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article explains the origin of the concept of employers’ liability in 1837 and notes the 
various reasons for the failure of this liability to be developed during the nineteenth century. 
It proceeds to look at the context in which the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) 
Act 1969 was enacted, looking at the content of the Act, and considering the environment at 
the time of its enactment, noting the then apparent imperfections in the legislation. The 
account then moves fast forward to the twenty-first century and questions whether the Act is 
now fit for purpose. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 (hereafter ELCIA) 
was to assist employees who suffered either accidents or diseases attributable to their work 
to obtain damages as compensation for their personal injuries. It is now nearly half a century 
since ELCIA was enacted. At that time there were critics who contended it was not fit for 
purpose.  This article looks back nearly two centuries to the origin of the concept of 
employers’ liability to compensate injured employees and traces developments in the 
following century to show the situation at the enactment of the ELCIA.  It summarises the 
provisions of the ELCIA and reviews its operation at that time. Finally, it jumps to the present 
time, to review how it relates to the current work relationships asking whether it is now 
serving its purpose. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND TO THE 1969 ACT 
 
The concept of employer’s liability can be traced back to Priestley v Fowler (1837)1. A father 
sued in negligence2 when the cart in which his son was travelling, having allegedly been 
overloaded so that one of its wheels gave way, threw the boy to the ground causing him 
injury.  The claim was that the employer had failed in his duty to keep the cart in a proper 
state of repair.  In court Lord Abinger C.B. noted it had been objected that the contract 
between master and servant had no implied duty to make the master liable for any damage 
to the servant but concluded: 
 
He is no doubt, bound to provide for the safety of his servant, in the course of his 
employment, to the best of his judgment, information and belief. 
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 Actually it was brought in ‘Case’, the precursor of negligence. 
In A Case of First Impression the late Brian Simpson related his search for the story behind 
Priestley v Fowler.3 At first instance the father won the claim and was awarded £100 
damages but on appeal, while Lord Abinger made the remark cited above, it was found that 
on the evidence the master was not liable because the accident was caused by another 
servant overloading the cart.  The employer (Fowler) meanwhile had become bankrupt, 
Priestley, having lost the case, had to pay the costs of the litigation and was sent to the 
debtor’s prison. 
 
The decision was remarkable by the broad terms in which it classified the relationship 
between employer and victim as a master and servant relationship whereas this terminology 
had hitherto been used in only a few types of employment, principally for domestic and 
agricultural workers. However passages in Lord Abinger’s judgment suggest that he had not 
appreciated the difference between someone with the status of servant working as an 
independent contractor and someone working under contract to serve the person for whose 
benefit he was working. This confusion may have helped Victorian courts avoid imposing on 
employers the duty to compensate injured workers.  On its facts the case was interpreted to 
mean that the employer was not liable for injuries attributable to the actions of a person ‘in 
common employment’ with the victim, though this was not a necessary interpretation and 
was regarded by some as incorrect.4 Whatever the merits of the argument5 ‘common 
employment was to be embedded in British employment law for a hundred years and one of 
a ‘trinity’ of reasons why employers’ liability did not flourish. 
 
Firstly, change came partly due to protective legislation such as the Factory Acts which 
imposed duties on employers and partly due to the birth of trade unions. In 1876 Alexander 
Macdonald MP for Stafford laid before the House of Commons a Bill (which had been 
prepared by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress) whose purpose 
was to abolish the doctrine of common employment.  The Bill was not enacted but it led to 
the Select Committee on Employer’s Liability which in turn led to the Employer’s Liability Act 
1880 which restricted but did not completely abolish the doctrine. ‘Common employment’  
lingered on until it was delivered a fatal blow by the House of Lords in Wilson and Clyde 
Coal Co. v. English [1938]6 where Lord Wright stated an employer had a non-delegable duty 
to provide a competent staff of men, adequate material and a proper system and effective 
supervision. 
 
Second, until the end of the nineteenth century the notion that the worker assumed the risks 
of the workplace also inhibited any development of employers’ liability.  Under this doctrine7 
if the evidence showed that a worker knew that there was a risk of injury where he had to 
work he had no remedy if the risk materialised.  Thus in Smith v Baker [1891]8 when a 
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  A.W.B. Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law, Chapter 5 pp.100-134. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press,). 
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 E.g. Brett LJ.in Evidence of Select Committee on Employer’s Liability 1877 (HC 1876 (372) IX, 669, 
in answer 1919. ’I think it may be suggested that the law as to the non-liability of masters with regard 
to fellow servants arose principally from the ingenuity of Lord Abinger in suggesting analogies in the 
case of Priestley v Fowler. 
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 ‘… there never was a more useful decision, or one of more practical importance in the whole history 
of the law.’ Pollock C.B. in Vose v Lancashire Railway Co. (1858) 2LJEx. 249. Contrast: ‘a principle 
as distasteful as it is alien to Scottish jurisprudence.’  Lord Macmillan in Radcliffe v Ribble Motor 
Services Ltd.  [1939] AC 215, 235. 
6
 AC 57. 
7
 Volenti non fit injuria. 
8
 A.C. 325. 
worker, who had to carry out his duties as rocks were carried over his head, was hit by a 
rock the employer pleaded the worker knew of and had therefore assumed the risk of the 
injury he suffered.  The House of Lords readily distinguished between knowledge of, and 
assumption of risk.  
 
The third obstacle was contributory negligence.9  If the victim had been negligent this 
defeated his claim until the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 enabled courts 
to apportion blame and award appropriate damages.10 
 
However the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 distracted employees’ attention from 
claiming damages. This Act introduced a scheme under which compensation became 
payable automatically whenever a workman met with an accident ‘arising out of and in the 
course of employment’ and was incapacitated from work.  Compensation took the form of 
weekly payments during incapacity. By its final form in 1925 the scheme covered specific 
diseases as well as accidents. A claim was processed through a simple procedure, but a 
claimant could not claim both damages and the statutory compensation.   
 
Following the decision in Groves v Wimborne11 the injured worker was also able to sue the 
employer for compensation for injury caused by the employer’s breach of a strict statutory 
duty; evidence of the breach was sufficient, it was not necessary to prove the employer had 
been negligent. 
 
The increased risk of incurring liability resulted in the growth of employers’ liability insurance. 
Nevertheless claims were more frequently made under the Workmen’s Compensation Acts 
than at common law. This may have been due to ‘touting’ by insurance companies.12 There 
was some growth in common law claims in the 1930s.  It has been suggested that this was 
due to awareness of the comparatively large awards made to road accident victims.13 The 
real growth in claims for damages had to wait until the repeal of the Workmen’s 
Compensation Acts in 1948. 
 
In the 1960s the 6th edition of Munkman’s Employer’s Liability at Common Law,14 after 
making brief reference to Priestley v Fowler, traced the development of both common law 
liability for negligence and liability for breach of statutory duty up to the eve of the1969 Act. 
Interestingly the author does not confine himself to the master and servant relationship; his 
coverage, deals also with liability to ‘workers’, a term whose meaning must not be confused  
with that given by statute to the same word today.15 The author explained16 the National 
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 However In Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 their Lordships 
alleviated the harshness of the law by declaring ‘It is not for every risky thing which a workman may 
do in his familiarity with the machinery that a plaintiff ought to be found guilty of contributory 
negligence. 
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 [1898] 2 QB 402. 
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 Holman Gregory Report on Workmen’s Compensation (1920) Cmd.816. 3858.   
13
 A. Russell Jones 7 M.L.R 13 at pp.20/21. 
14
 Published by Butterworths (London) in 1966, intended primarily for practitioners. 
15 The Employers and Workmen Act 1875 distinguished ‘workmen’ from ‘higher status’ employees 
according different rules to each category.  This Act was finally repealed in the Statute Law (Repeals) 
Act 1943. The situation is explained fully in S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market 
(Oxford, OUP), Chapter 2, The Origins of the Contract of Employment.  The meaning of worker 
depended very much on the context. The Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 s.7 defines a workman 
Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Scheme which replaced the Workmen’s Compensation Acts in 
1948 and applied to all employees and apprentices.  Under the scheme employees and 
employers paid weekly contributions into the Industrial Injuries Fund, and the fund received 
contributions from the Exchequer.  Benefits were paid out of the Fund in the case of 
industrial accidents and certain specified diseases Thus reliance on social security could be 
more attractive to the victim than undertaking the risk and expense of suing for damages for 
work-related injuries.17  
 
In 1969 a private member’s Bill, which led to the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) 
Act, was presented by Mr Hugh D. Brown, MP. This Act was prompted by, and intended to 
reverse, the decision of the House of Lords in Davie v New Merton Board Mills.18 The 
claimant in that case suffered an eye injury because a ‘drift’19 shattered when he hit it with a 
hammer; their Lordships held the employer was not negligent and therefore not liable for the 
injury.  
 
The intent of the Act (hereafter DEA) is encapsulated in s.1(1): 
 
(1) Where after the commencement of this Act— 
(a) an employee suffers personal injury in the course of his employment in 
consequence of a defect in equipment provided by his employer for the purposes 
of the employer’s business; and 
(b) the defect is attributable wholly or partly to the fault of a third party (whether 
identified or not), 
 
the injury shall be deemed to be also attributable to negligence on the part of the 
employer … . 
 
In prolonged discussion in committee, there had been concern about imposing liability on an 
employer who had not been negligent: 
 
If it is said that when an employee is injured in the course of his employment, when 
there has been a genuine, bona fide, accident, he should be entitled to compensation 
on a generous scale through some insurance scheme, that may be a first class idea, 
but it is a different kind of argument.20 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
as ‘any person who is engaged in an employment to which this Act applies, whether by way of manual 
labour or otherwise’. 
16
 Appendix 2, p.557. 
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 Relying on the social security may be disproportionately burdensome to the national economy 
compared with employers’ liability. In his book Accidents, Compensation and the Law 1970 ed. 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson) P.S. Atiyah noted employers’ liability had the merit of making 
people pay for the costs they impose and the cost of insurance may cause employers to take care, 
but he nevertheless favoured social security. By way of contrast, in the Cost of Accidents’ Student ed. 
(YUP: 1970) Calabresi, though critical of tort liability, argued that tort liability was preferable to 
universal no-fault accident compensation, by reason of the deterrent effects of the tort system and its 
resulting effect on the allocation of resources.  However, neither take into account the preference of 
victims and notably both New South Wales and New Zealand have reinstated employers’ liability.                              
18
 [1969] AC 604. 
19
 A kind of chisel.                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
This concern proved unnecessary because in the same Parliamentary session the ELCIA 
was enacted through a private member’s Bill. It was introduced, by David Watkins on 27th 
November 1968,21 by the ‘Presentation’ procedure. Under this procedure a Member formally 
introduces the title of the Bill but does not speak in support of it. Thus it is not immediately 
apparent what prompted it. However a debate in the Upper House makes a passing 
reference22  to a horrific fire in 1968 in a furniture factory in James Watt Street Glasgow. 
Twenty-two people were unable to escape because the windows had been barred.23 The 
employers carried no employers’ liability insurance. The resulting legislation was the short 
Act which together with subsequent regulations, is central to this article: 
 
3.  THE EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY (COMPULSORY INSURANCE) ACT 1969  
 
In summary, the Act provided: 
S.1(1) … every employer carrying on business in Great Britain shall insure … with an 
authorised insurer … against liability for bodily injury or disease sustained by his 
employees, and arising out of and in the course of their employment in Great Britain 
… .24 
 
S.2(1) … ‘employee’ means an individual who has entered into or works under a 
contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer. 
 
S.2(2) This Act shall not require an employer to insure: 
 
(a) in respect of an employee of whom the employer is the husband, wife, 
father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, step-father, step-mother, son, 
daughter, grandson, grand-daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, brother, sister, 
half-brother or half-sister.25 
…,26 
 
S 4(1) Provision may be made by regulations for securing that certificates of 
insurance … are issued by insurers to employers … 
 
S.4(2) Where a certificate of insurance is required to be issued to an employer … the 
employer shall … 
 
a) comply with any regulations requiring him to display copies of the 
certificate of insurance for the information of his employees;27 
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 Hansard 27
th
 November 1968 Vol.774 c.512. David Watkins was Labour MP for Consett from 1966-
1983. 
22
 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1969/oct/14/employers-liability-compulsory-insurance . 
23
 Originally reported in The Glasgow Herald November 19
th
1968; recalled more recently 
http://glasgowfirejournal.blogspot.co.uk/2012/09/james-watt-street.html . 
24
 SI 1975/1443 applied the Act to offshore installations; otherwise s.1 exempts insurance for 
employment outside Great Britain. 
25
 SI 1998/2573 and SI 2004/2882 have the effect of limiting this to the employer who is an 
unincorporated sole trader. 
26
 S.3 contained a list of public bodies not covered by the Act. The list of public servants covered has 
also been amended by Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) (Amendment) Regulations 2011. 
SI 2011/286. 
 b) produce the certificate of insurance … to any inspector authorised by the 
Secretary of State … 
 
 
S.5 An employer who on any day is not insured in accordance with this Act … shall 
be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine … . 
 
S.6(1) The Secretary of State may by statutory instrument make regulations … .  
 
S.7(2) This Act shall not extend to Northern Ireland.28 
 
There were at least 9 statutory instruments made between 1971 and 1998 but these were 
revoked by SI 1998/2573 which consolidated and updated the earlier regulations. The new 
statutory instrument included the following provisions:  
 
Reg. 2 prohibited the insurer from qualifying its liability by any condition in the 
contract with the employer. 
Reg. 3 required the employer to be insured for £5 million in respect of any one 
employee in respect of a single claim. 
Regs.6 and 7 required the employer to enable an inspector to inspect the insurance 
certificate. 
Reg.8 required an inspector, when visiting the employer’s premises to provide 
evidence of his authority. 
 
4. THE ELCIA IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS ENACTMENT IN 1969 
 
The ELCIA and the DEA29 were two of the earliest pieces of legislation relating to the 
employment contract to use the then modern terminology ‘employer and employee’ to 
distinguish employees from independent contractors30.  It is unsurprising therefore that s.2(1) 
of ELCIA found it necessary to define employee as a servant or apprentice. 
 
Section 1 of the ELCIA imposed on the employer liability to compensate ‘for bodily injury or 
disease sustained by his employees, and arising out of and in the course of their 
employment’. This phrase had its origins in the Workmen’s Compensation Acts.  In this 
respect the coverage of the 1969 Act coincided exactly with the wording of the National 
Insurance Industrial Injuries legislation which had in turn reiterated the wording of the earlier 
Workmen’s Compensation Acts. The association between employers’ liability and ‘course of 
employment’ can even be traced back to the statement of Lord Abinger C.B., but it had by 
1969 been the subject of much litigation.  Mansfield Cooper commented that; ‘The phrase 
has been productive of a torrent of litigation, but Parliament has evolved no better definition.’ 
The author footnotes: 
                                                                                                                                                  
27
 SI 2008/1765 exempts the employer from displaying the certificate at workplaces stating it will be 
sufficient ‘if the certificate is made available in electronic form and each relevant employee to whom it 
relates has reasonable access to it in that form. 
28
 Regulations to a similar effect have now been made. 
29
 No attempt has been made to consolidate the two pieces of employers’ liability legislation. 
Interestingly neither Act applied to ‘workers’ although Munkman had demonstrated their importance 
and that ‘employee’ and ‘worker’ might not be synonymous. However arguably the definition of 
employee in s.2(1) is wide enough to cover workmen. 
30
 The first was the Contracts of Employment Act 1963. 
 It is true that the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946, s.7 (4) provides 
that an accident arising in the course of an insured person’s employment will be 
deemed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, also to have arisen out of that 
employment.  But it is submitted that this does not extend the definition of an 
accident.  At the most, it removes the burden of proof from the plaintiff.31In spite of 
apparently justifiable concerns about inclusion of the phrase in ELCIA s.1(1) it does 
not appear to have caused difficulties in practice. 
 
These remarks are made at the end of the Chapter on the Master’s Liability for Injury, the 
greater part of which is devoted to common law liability and analyses this in terms of case 
law on the tort of negligence without reference to the phrase ‘arising out of and in the course 
of employment’. 
 
The ELCIA did not change the existing laws on liability; the intention was to ensure 
compensation in cases where there was liability; for the most part this was liability for 
negligent conduct but there were some areas of strict liability, notably liability under the new 
DEA and for some breaches of statutory duty. However, the ELCIA was almost immediately 
subject to scathing criticism because it: 
 
Contains so many flaws and gaps that some employees will continue to go 
uncompensated or have to settle with insurance companies for a fraction of the 
amount they would have been awarded by a court of law.32 
 
Yet it is noteworthy that the ECLIA system survived unscathed by the Royal Commission on 
Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury which reported in 1978.33 The 
Commission reported: 
 
There was a remarkable unanimity among our witnesses that the structure of the 
industrial injuries scheme had stood the test of time. 
… 
The present degree of overlap between social security and tort is especially marked 
in this field. Nearly all those who obtain tort compensation in respect of work injuries 
will also have been entitled to industrial injury benefit.  A decision to recommend an 
end to the duplication of compensation, without anything to balance it, would have 
implied a drop in entitlement for those injured through the fault of the employer.34 
 
Interestingly while the Commission supported the retention of employers’ common law 
liability it did not expressly endorse ‘no fault’ liability for breach of statutory duty, though an 
earlier paragraph recommended the continuation of no fault provision in the context of the 
industrial injuries scheme.35,36 
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 W. Mansfield Cooper and J.C. Wood, Outlines of Industrial Law, 4
th
 ed. (London: Butterworths) at 
p.345. 
32
 R. A. Hanson, The Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 – A Broken Reed ILJ Vol. 
3 pp. 79-86. Many of the criticisms were actually made in the Hansard report on the debate already 
referenced http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1969/oct/14/employers-liability-compulsory-
insurance .  
33
 The Pearson Commission CMND.7054-1. 
34
 Paragraphs 283 and 284 at p 69 of the Report.  
35
 At paragraph 281 on p.69. 
 Neither the ECLIA, nor the Industrial Injuries Act made any provision for the self-employed.  
They were expected to provide for themselves, or sue the employer for whom they were 
working at the time of their injury.  The unskilled manual worker would be most unlikely to 
even consider, let alone afford, taking out personal injury insurance.  The employer was not 
required by legislation to carry public liability insurance and the small employer, possibly 
self-employed, would be unlikely to carry public liability insurance.  Finally, the self-employed 
were much less likely than employees to be members of a trade union; employees who were 
members of a trade union would then, as now, be quite likely to enjoy the support and 
guidance of their union in pursuing compensation.  
 
A Road Accidents 
 
Damages in respect of road accidents were never intended to be recoverable under the 
ELCIA.37  Compensation for injuries caused by a vehicle were always claims against vehicle 
insurance.38 
 
An exceptional case was Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd.39 Father and son 
were employed by the defendant and the son, negligently driving the employer’s lorry, ran 
over his father. The House of Lords held the son, not the employer, was liable for the 
damages payable to the father because the employer was not liable for the son’s 
negligence.  After this case insurers entered a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ not to pursue this 
practice unless there were exceptional circumstances. Thus any attempt to reintroduce the 
doctrine of common employment was defeated. 
 
The victims of road traffic accidents had a number of advantages over the victims whose 
claims lay under the ELCIA.  First, vehicle insurance unlike s.2 of the ELCIA does not 
exclude liability for injury to close relatives. Second, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau provides 
compensation to the victim of uninsured drivers.40 Third, under road traffic law an insured 
driver cannot escape liability for injury caused by an uninsured driver who he or she permits 
to drive the insured vehicle.41 
 
5.  FAST FORWARD TO TODAY: IS THE ELCIA NOW FIT FOR PURPOSE? 
 
A.  Addressing Problems with ELCIA 
 
In 2003 the Department of Work and Pensions opened a review of the operation of the 
ELCIA, setting out the then current difficulties with the scheme and suggesting an agenda for 
action. The focus of the investigation was on the insurance industry.  DWP was concerned at 
the high costs of insurance; it noted that some insurers had opted out of providing cover in 
high risk situations and ‘long tail’ diseases42 might endanger cover.  It was concerned that 
                                                                                                                                                  
36
 One of the authors together with Bob Hepple and Richard Howells gave evidence to the Pearson 
Commission on behalf of the Industrial Law Society.  The memorandum of their evidence was 
published in the ILJ Vol. 4, No.4 pp.195-217. 
37
 SI1978/2573, Reg.9 (Sch.2) expressly excludes such claims. 
38
 Road accident compensation was subject to the same criticism as employers’ liability by both 
Atiyah and Calibresi.  Atiyah suggested these compensation schemes owed their survival due to the 
vested interests of the Bar and insurance companies. 
39
 [1957] A.C.555. 
40
 These two matters were identified by R.A. Hasson in his article in the ILJ in 1974. 
41
 Monk v Warbey [1935] 1KB 75.  This has some parallels with the DE Act. 
42
 Diseases like asbestos that often do not become manifest till long after exposure resulting in 
difficulties in attributing liability. 
these developments were causing some failures to insure, particularly in SMEs.  The impact 
of this report can be traced in much that has happened since.43 
 
B.  Rehabilitation 
 
The DWP’s review expressed concern that the ELCIA scheme of insurance made 
inadequate provision for rehabilitation of victims.  This matter was addressed in a wide 
ranging research report commissioned by HSE.44 This research included telephone 
interviews an outcome of which was: 
 
All were very supportive of rehabilitation. All felt there was enough evidence in the 
UK, even if anecdotal, to convince them there was a cost benefit as well as a moral 
case. … All were open to the idea of rehabilitation being compulsory and paid for 
from insurance, but suppliers of rehabilitation need to be amenable to this. All felt that 
employers should have more responsibilities for rehabilitation.45 
 
No evidence has been found that this recommendation has been progressed.46 
   
C.  Enforcement of the Act 
 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) was created by the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 (HASAWA). The Act makes provision for the appointment of inspectors47 and for the 
enforcement of the Act48 and regulations made relevant to it (known as relevant statutory 
provisions) through these Inspectors. There has been no legislation empowering HSE to 
enforce the ELCIA.  Nevertheless HSE guidance on its powers of enforcement makes clear 
that it can enforce the 1969 Act:49  
 
The maximum fines for offences under the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory 
Insurance) Act 1969 are £1,000 (level 3 on the standard scale) in respect of s.4 
offences, and £2,500 (level 4 on the standard scale) in respect of s.5 offences. These 
offences are triable only in the magistrates’ courts. 
 
The source of HSE’s authority is explained in operational guidance:50  
 
Since 1975, HSE has been the enforcement body for the Employers’ Liability 
(Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 (ELCI) as a result of an agency agreement 
                                               
43
 Unfortunately DWP has now archived this report. 
44
 http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/crr_pdf/2002/crr02436.pdf  Changing business behaviour - 
would bearing the true cost of poor health and safety performance make a difference? Report 
prepared by Greenstreet Berman Ltd. 
45
 At p.129. 
46
 Damages awarded in personal injury cases may include a sum for rehabilitation, but this would be 
directed to support for those permanently disabled, e.g. employment of a carer, or adaptation of living 
accommodation.  The cost of recovery in the immediate aftermath of injury is likely to fall on social 
services, especially the NHS. 
47
 Ss.18-32. 
48
 Much enforcement is delegated to local authority inspectors, under Health and Safety (Enforcing 
Authority) Regulations SI 1998/494 and the premises for which they are responsible are possibly 
those most likely to be in default in respect of the 1969 Act. 
49
 http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/enforcementguide/court/sentencing-penalties.htm#P28_3036 . 
50
 http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/og/og-00042.htm . 
between HSC51 and the Department of Employment (now the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP)). 
 
All HSE operational Band 2, 3, and 4 inspectors should be warranted to enforce 
ELCI, and should routinely ask for sight of ELCI certificates during inspection visits 
(NB. ‘Routinely’ does not necessarily mean ‘all’).  
 
Local authority inspectors are not so authorised. This guidance, which is intended primarily 
for inspectors, makes clear that as ELCIA is not a relevant statutory provision the 
enforcement powers under HASAWA (which in some cases include the power to bring a 
case upon indictment for trial before jury) cannot be used in respect of offences under the 
ELCIA. Nor can notices be issued to require an employer either to improve its performance52 
or to prohibit it from continuing a course of conduct.53 The guidance continues: 
 
Where the only offence that could be proved is failure to display a certificate, 
employers would not, as a rule, be prosecuted unless they appear to have been 
intentionally uncooperative and obstructive. Employers who have been cooperative 
should be sent a letter reminding them of the obligations to keep the certificate on 
display. 
 
In some instances we may consider it appropriate to prosecute for non-insurance on 
the day on which a particular accident happened. But, the delay in receiving 
notification of that accident means there is limited time in which to bring the case to 
court, because of the six month time limit for laying informations about a summary 
only offence … 
 
Where failure to insure is discovered at the same time as an offence under the 
relevant statutory provisions is being considered for prosecution, it is desirable that 
all charges should be prosecuted together. 
 
HSE’s publishes enforcement statistics54, but these statistics apply only to offences under 
the HASAWA and there is no evidence in statistical reports of prosecutions under the ELCIA. 
Nevertheless HSE ‘Press Releases’ do show that there have been some prosecutions for 
failure to insure and unsurprisingly the offenders appear to be small enterprises.55 
 
It is disappointing that the DWP proposals that local authority inspectors be given 
enforcement powers has apparently not been progressed and it is not clear that the 
                                               
51
 The Health and Safety Commission, a tripartite body responsible to Parliament for the operation  of 
the Act, was abolished and its work given to HSE  (SI 2008/960). 
52
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Insurance. 
suggested liaison with insurers has become operational to provide inspectors with particulars 
of employers who are insured.56 
 
It may be speculated that the majority of employers will be covered by insurance in 
compliance with ELCIA.57 In many cases cover will be provided in the context of a package 
including insurance against public liability, through one insurance company.58  Most 
employers may be happy to pay the insurance premium and be spared dealing with a claim; 
most claims where liability is not disputed will be settled out of court by the insurance 
company.59  There is of course the danger that too many claims will result in an increased 
insurance premium. HSE investigated the extent of failure to insure.60 The report stated that 
in 2002 the Federation of Small Businesses stated 8% of businesses were trading without 
insurance. The HSE researchers carried out a postal survey and then estimated: 
 
‘…112,559 employees in total employed in firms without ELCI. This is 0.53% of the 
21,018,000 employed workforce, excluding 3,677,000 central and local government 
employees and 2,937,000 people in organisations with no employees (i.e. sole 
proprietorships and partnerships comprising only self-employed owner managers).  
Expressed as the number of organisations this equates to about 10,000 
organisations lacking ELCI out of about 1.2million enterprises with employees in the 
UK (1.01m micro, 175,660 small, 29,470 medium enterprises and 8,210 large 
organisations).’ 
 
The survey also found a number were refused insurance by their previous insurer. The 
Federation of Small Business survey had reported that 25% of their respondents said that 
ELCI was difficult or impossible to find. Central and local government employees are 
exempted from insuring under ELCI Act because there is another scheme for them 
 
The report confirms that defaulters are likely to be small enterprises that are likely to be 
‘under the radar’ of the inspectorates unless there is an accident, and the occurrence of the 
accident may well put the employer out of business, thus frustrating any attempt to enforce 
liability to compensate.61  
 
D.  Long Tail Claims 
Another cause for concern, highlighted by HSE statistics, is that in 2012 there were 2535 
deaths due to mesothelioma (a cancer of the lung lining) caused by past exposure to 
asbestos.  As the DWP report noted the incidence of such ‘long tail’ claims has been of 
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[2015] CSIH 11 PD672/09. 
special concern in relation to settlement of compensation claims.62 The Mesothelioma Act 
2014 enabled setting up a scheme for a levy on insurers in order to fund the compensation 
of victims of this disease.63  
 
E.  Problem of Uninsured Employers 
 
There is still no general arrangement comparable to the Motor Insurers’ Bureau to assist in 
other situations where employees have no recourse to compensation under the ELCIA. In 
2009 an Employers’ Liability Insurance Bureau Bill was lodged by Andrew Dismore MP, by 
presentation, but it failed to be enacted.64  
 
F.  National Insurance 
 
The National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act has been repealed and the burden of 
ensuring income maintenance during the time an employee is off work due to sickness has 
been transferred to the employer.65 The statutory sick pay scheme requires the employer to 
pay an employee, who earns more than the minimum each week66 statutory sick pay, after 
the employee has been off work for 3 days, during the period of absence from work for up to 
28 weeks, subject to medical certification that the employee is unfit for work. To be entitled 
to receive statutory sick pay the employee does not need to have suffered an industrial injury 
or have an industrial disease.  The criteria is simply unfitness for work.  Consequently the 
difficult phrase ‘arising out of and in the course of employment’ has ceased to have any 
relevance in this context.  
 
While the current scheme places more responsibility on both employer and employee, it 
maintains the advantage which the national insurance scheme gave to the employee: 
workers who are not employees do not benefit. In some respects returning to the employer 
responsibility for the provision of compensation harks back to the nineteenth century 
Workmen’s Compensation Acts, but it differs in that the employer’s responsibility today is not 
confined to illness due to an accident or industrial disease but extends to all sickness 
whatever its cause. Also, unlike the nineteenth century scheme, the employee does not have 
to choose between income maintenance and damages: taking advantage of the sick pay 
provisions does not disentitle the claimant to the benefit of the ELCIA scheme, where there 
has been an industrial injury, whether or not that injury results in time off work.67  
 
The employee who becomes disabled as the result of an industrial disease or accident is 
entitled to claim from the social security system industrial disability benefit scheme.68 Section 
94(1) of the Act provides: 
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  In a claim under ELCIA the benefits received will be clawed back and the sum paid by way of 
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 As established by the Social Security Claims and Benefits Act 1992. 
Industrial injuries benefit shall be payable where an employed earner suffers 
personal injury caused after 4th July 1948 by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment … 
 
To this extent therefore the troublesome phrase ‘arising out of and in the course of 
employment’ lives on. 
 
G.  Employees and Other Workers 
 
In 1969 workers who were not employees would be classified as self-employed under 
contracts for services rather than contracts of service unless the word ‘workman’ was used 
indicating  distinction from a ‘higher status’ employee, as was the case in the Workmen’s 
Compensation Acts.69  Since then ‘worker’ has been given a statutory definition.  Section 
230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: 
 
In this Act ‘worker’ … means an individual who has entered into or works under (or 
where the employment has ceased) worked under - 
 
(a) a contract of employment, or 
 
(b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) 
whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform 
personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status 
is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or 
business undertaking carried on by the individual; 
 
And any reference to a worker’s contract shall be construed accordingly. 
 
In respect of the statutory rights set out in the 1996 Act itself care is necessary to distinguish 
those which give rights to workers under s.230(3)(b) from those (such as unfair dismissal) 
which apply only to employees. HSE is right to state in its guidance to ELCIA that it is not 
obvious whether a worker who is not clearly an employee is now covered under ELCIA. It 
suggests:  
 
You may need employers’ liability insurance for someone who works for you where: 
- you deduct national insurance and income tax from the money you pay them; 
- you have the right to control where and when they work and how they do it; 
- you supply their work materials and equipment; 
- you have a right to any profit your workers make although you may choose to 
share this with them through commission, performance pay or shares in the 
company; 
- you require that person only to deliver the service and they cannot employ a 
substitute if they are unable to do the work; or 
- they are treated in the same way as other employees, for example, they do 
the same work under the same conditions as someone else you employ.70 
 
HSE’s advice that the employer may need to seek legal advice is sound. 
 
Case law provides numerous examples of the difficulty of identifying a worker from an 
independent contractor. Relevant in the current context is Hospital Medical Group Ltd v 
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Westwood 71 where the Court of Appeal found that a doctor who had willingly signed a 
contract describing him as self-employed72 was a worker within s.230(3)(b) on the basis that 
he was integrated into the hospital organisation.73 However, he was not actually an 
employee, which meant, if this had been material to his claim that he would not have been 
within the remit of ELCIA.  Nevertheless employers should bear in mind that the courts do 
not sympathise with employers who require the worker to sign a sham contract as a self-
employed person. This was well demonstrated in both Protectacoat Firthglow Ltd v Szilagyi74 
and Autoclenz v Belcher.75 Whether a contract is a sham or not will only be tested if the 
person who has signed the contract subsequently claims s/he is being deprived of an 
entitlement and it has yet to be established that the right to obtain compensation under 
ELCIA could be secured in this way. 
 
H.  Agency Workers 
 
Another category of people who may not be covered are agency workers.  European 
directive 2008/104 EC envisages that the worker will have a contract of employment or an 
’employment relationship’ with the agency76. However, Regulation 3 (1)(b)of the Agency 
Workers Regulations 2010 77 offers  a more flexible definition of this relationship by providing 
that an agency worker is an individual who : 
 
Has a contract with the temporary work agency which is – 
(i) a contract of employment with the agency, or 
(ii) any other contract with the agency to perform work or services personally 
 
Given the frequency of reliance by employers on agency contracts this suggests that there 
are likely to be many workers who are not insured under ELCIA, particularly as it is apparent 
that an individual assigned to an employer would not be deemed to be an employee of the 
organisation to which the assignment is made. 
 
I.  Volunteers 
 
Most insurers have traditionally interpreted ‘employees’ to include volunteers which is 
surprising because in some organisations the number working as volunteers may greatly 
exceed the number of employees, for example in a chain of charity shops or in wildlife trusts.  
In the latter case volunteers may work outdoors in heavy manual labour, challenging the 
employer to carry out careful risk assessments, and provide close supervision to ensure safe 
systems of work are fully observed. 
 
A technique developed by employers in recent years is persuading someone seeking 
employment to accept work as a volunteer with the possibility, which rarely materialises, of 
paid employment if their work is considered satisfactory.78  It is to be hoped that insurers are 
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J.  Domestic Servants 
 
The householder who employs a cleaner to visit occasionally is unlikely to be legally 
responsible for taking out ELCIA insurance for that person who may either be self-employed 
or working through an agency.  However where the home help lives in and works only for 
one household insurance should be taken out, but it is doubtful whether in practice such 
employers will carry ELCIA. Indeed many such home helps are immigrants whose very 
entitlement to be working in this country may be dubious.  Unfortunately, this is not a 
situation where HSE can intervene to ensure the employer is insured, because s.51 of the 
HASAWA 1974 Act denies the enforcement agency jurisdiction: 
 
In relation to a person by reason only that he employs another, or is himself 
employed as a domestic servant in a private household. 
 
Unless inspectors have access to a workplace under the HASAWA 1974 Act they cannot be 
aware of any employment in those premises. 
 
J.  Homeworkers 
 
Live-in domestic servants must be distinguished from employees working at home whose 
employers require a permit.  If they are injured while at home and their injury is attributable 
to work undertaken for their employer they too should be covered. However, this is a 
situation where the much maligned phrase ‘arising out of and in the course of employment’ 
will be very relevant.79  The employer will always be advised to do a risk assessment of the 
domestic work place.80 Many homeworkers, (or ‘outworkers’ as they used to be called under 
the old Factories Acts) may be supplied with articles or substances for use at home. In this 
case it is important to determine whether they are employees or self-employed.  If they are 
employed, HSE spells out the need to ensure as far as is reasonably practicable that the 
articles or substances are safe81 and that there is a risk assessment that the home 
environment is suitable for this work.82 
 
K.  No Fault Liability 
 
By 1900 and thereafter83 case law had established that employers were liable not only for 
the consequences of their negligence but also for injuries which arose from breach of strict 
                                                                                                                                                  
‘consideration’ needed to make an enforceable contract.  If it did make the person a worker this would 
not help unless the arrangement were a contract of employment. 
79
 In the case of homeworking such as sewing or ironing one of the biggest risks is of accidents 
caused by the presence of children. 
80
 Para.26 of the Guidance to the Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992 
explains that while the requirement that every employer must assess work stations, in the case of a 
homeworker the most practicable means of carrying out this assessment is for the employee to 
complete and submit to the employer an ergonomic checklist. 
81
 Section 6 of HASAWA 1974. 
82
 http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg226.pdf.  Unfortunately while HSE draws attention to the great 
increase in homeworking in recent years it admits its own research paper is now outdated. 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr262.pdf . 
83
 Following Groves v Wimborne [1898]. 
statutory duties. The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 changed that.  The general 
intention of the Act was to lighten the burdens that legislation imposed on business 
enterprises. Section 69, which came into effect on 1st October 2013 amended s.47(2) of 
HASAWA.  Section 47 in its original form was intended to maintain civil liability for breach of 
statutory duty but now reads: 
 
 (2) Breach of a duty imposed by a statutory instrument containing (whether alone or 
with other provision) health and safety regulations shall not be actionable except to 
the extent that regulations under this section so provide.  
 
(2A) Breach of a duty imposed by an existing statutory provision shall not be 
actionable except to the extent that regulations under this section so provide 
(including by modifying any of the existing statutory provisions). 
 
The explanatory note to the Regulatory Reform Act explains the amendment: 
 
… reverses the present position on civil liability, with the effect, unless any 
exceptions apply, that it will only be possible to claim for compensation in relation 
to affected health and safety legislation where it can be proved that the duty 
holder (usually the employer) has been negligent. This means that in future, for 
all relevant claims, duty-holders will only have to defend themselves against 
negligence. 
 
Section 69 makes clear that the change in the law is not to have retrospective effect. 
This means it should not impact on claims for diseases where the cause of the disease 
is exposure at work before this amendment to the law occurred.
84
 The strict liability 
under the DEA should not be affected by the Regulatory Reform Act, since it is not a 
relevant statutory provision under the HASAWA 1974 Act
85
.    
 
The impact of this deregulation upon the liability of the employer is a major cause for 
concern among workers who have traditionally benefited from this form of strict liability, 
but whether s.69 will have a large impact is unclear. In practice it could be that cases are 
contested on the basis that the employer was negligent in breaking the strict duty.  
Insurance companies providing cover could find their costs of dealing with claims are 
increased.
86
  
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this article is to determine whether the concept of employers’ liability, 
embedded in British employment law with such difficulty in the century following the 
statement made by Lord Abinger in Priestley v Fowler (1837) is an appropriate way to 
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fund the needs of those who suffer work-related injury or disease. 
 
The Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 purported to enact a 
comprehensive scheme to require employers to pay damages to compensate 
employees who suffered injury arising out of and in the course of their employment. Five 
years afterwards this statute was described as a broken reed not least because it failed 
to provide anything comparable to the Motor Insurers’ Bureau to ensure the 
compensation of employees whose employer did not carry insurance.  This remains the 
situation apart from the coverage made by the Mesothelioma Act 2014 for those who 
suffer from this disease. 
 
The first decade of the current century witnessed a concern, focused on the insurance 
industry, that the ELCIA was not working well, including that it failed to take account of 
the cost of rehabilitating victims.  Two research reports commissioned by HSE were 
reassuring.   
 
One report estimated that only ‘0.53% of the 21,018,000 employed workforce’ were 
without cover and this was either because insurance companies rejected them or their 
employers were ignorant of their legal responsibilities. Considering the twenty-first 
century workplace it is hard to reconcile the reality with this report when, as has been 
shown in this account, so many in the workforce are excluded from cover because they 
are not technically employees. 
 
The other report stated that there was common agreement that more needed to be done 
about rehabilitation but appeared to have a conviction that this was a curable problem; 
curable it may be but nothing has yet been done to cure it.  The major cost of 
rehabilitation immediately following injury falls on the National Health Service. 
 
In some jurisdictions (e.g. Canada, Kenya and Singapore) the only statutory liability of 
employers is to provide income maintenance not dissimilar to that provided in Britain 
under the Social Security Contribution and Benefits Act 1992. In such cases any further 
provision for victims of industry has to come from whatever social security systems exist, 
or possibly from the victim’s personal insurance cover. 
 
In Britain, the social security system bears more of the burden of providing for workplace 
injuries than is generally appreciated.  Apart from the role played by the NHS, there is 
the Industrial Disability scheme providing income for those with long term disabilities. 
There is also the need to provide income maintenance and meet other costs, such as 
housing, for all those ‘workers’ and others who are not within the ambit of the ELCIA but 
have been rendered incapable of employment. Further, if s.69 of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 achieves its intended purpose and relieves employers of 
liability for breach of statutory duties the consequences of this will also fall back on social 
security. 
 
Additionally compliance with the 1969 Act is not very well monitored. Enforcement 
depends on HSE picking up offences in the course of inspections.  It appears that local 
authority inspectors do not have this power and there is also no statistical record 
published of the number of prosecutions and the penalties imposed. 
 
Thus our final question is whether Britain should take Professor Atiyah’s view and repeal 
the ELCIA. This would entail reliance on the social security system to make provision for 
the victims of industry and the HSE to punish (and thereby deter) employers whose 
negligence causes injury or disease. Alternatively, bearing in mind the views of the 
Pearson Commission, and the interests of the victims, can the present system be 
improved by legislation so that it truly reflects the intentions of the Employers’ Liability 
(Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969? 
 
